Irony and dialectics: one-dimensional man and 1968 by Jay, Martin
www.ssoar.info
Irony and dialectics: one-dimensional man and
1968
Jay, Martin
Veröffentlichungsversion / Published Version
Zeitschriftenartikel / journal article
Empfohlene Zitierung / Suggested Citation:
Jay, M. (2018). Irony and dialectics: one-dimensional man and 1968. Revista Mexicana de Ciencias Políticas y
Sociales, 63(234), 67-84. https://doi.org/10.22201/fcpys.2448492xe.2018.234.65810
Nutzungsbedingungen:
Dieser Text wird unter einer CC BY-NC-ND Lizenz
(Namensnennung-Nicht-kommerziell-Keine Bearbeitung) zur




This document is made available under a CC BY-NC-ND Licence
(Attribution-Non Comercial-NoDerivatives). For more Information
see:
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0
Diese Version ist zitierbar unter / This version is citable under:
https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-60998-9
67Irony and dIalectIcs: One-DimensiOnal man and 1968 ⎥
Revista Mexicana de Ciencias Políticas y Sociales⎥ Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México
Nueva Época, Año lxiii, núm. 234 ⎥ septiembre-diciembre de 2018 ⎥ pp. 67-84⎥ ISSN-2448-492X
doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.22201/fcpys.2448492xe.2018.234.65810
∗ History Department, University of California, Berkeley. E-mail: <martjay@berkeley.edu>.
Irony and Dialectics: One-dimensional Man and 1968
Ironía y dialéctica: El hombre unidimensional y 1968
Martin Jay∗
Recibido el 25 de enero de 2018
Aceptado el 17 de junio de 2018
ABSTRACT
In this article, the author analyses the role of 
irony in one of the texts that had the most in-
fluence in the 1968 movements around the 
world: The One-dimensional Man, by Herbert 
Marcuse. Understanding irony as an evident 
sign of human two-dimensionality, and em-
phasizing its dialectical potential, the author 
questions the subversive viability and the spe-
cific characteristics of every type of irony. To 
conclude, he focuses in the operability of irony 
in Marcuse’s work to encourage resilience and 
increase the possibility of inspiring political en-
gagement through it.
Keywords: 1968 movements; Herbert Marcuse; 
One-dimensional Man; irony; political engage-
ment.
RESUMEN
En el presente artículo, el autor analiza el papel 
que juega la ironía en uno de los textos que más 
influyeron en los movimientos de 1968 alrede-
dor del mundo: El hombre unidimensional, de 
Herbert Marcuse. Entendiendo la ironía como 
una muestra evidente de la bidimensionalidad 
humana y haciendo énfasis en su potencial dia-
léctico, el autor se cuestiona sobre la viabilidad 
subversiva y las características particulares de 
cada tipo de ironía. Para concluir se centra en 
la operatividad que tiene la ironía en la obra 
de Marcuse para fomentar el desarrollo de re-
siliencia y aumentar la posibilidad de inspirar 
participación política a través de ella.
Palabras clave: movimientos de 1968; Herbert 
Marcuse; El hombre unidimensional; ironía; ac-
tivismo político.
The joke played by history on Herbert Marcuse’s One-dimensional Man was almost imme-
diate. Written in the early l960’s, although arguably in preparation for the previous thirty 
years, the book expressed a profound pessimism about the chances for meaningful discontent 
in a culture that had lost its critical edge, a society that no longer had a revolutionary subject 
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in the working class, and a politics that pretended to be democratic while tacitly continuing 
the totalitarianism it ostensibly opposed. Whatever promise there might be in the technolo-
gical advances of modern industrial society to alleviate suffering and share abundance was 
thwarted, so Marcuse argued, by the fetish of a purely instrumentalized reason that mas-
ked the irrationality of the capitalist system as a whole. The passage from critical theory to 
liberating practice was blocked, and Marx’s injunction in the eleventh Thesis on Feuerbach 
no longer to interpret, but instead to change society, could not be meaningfully honored. 
“The critical theory of society,” Marcuse grimly concluded, “possesses no concepts which 
could bridge the gap between the present and future; holding no promise and showing no 
success, it remains negative” (Marcuse, 1991: 257). The only alternative he could envisage 
was a vague gesture of solidarity with those who remained marginalized by the system, the 
outcasts who quixotically devote their lives to what he called, somewhat melodramatically 
in capital letters, “the Great Refusal”.
Although Marcuse had already introduced the distinction between one and two-dimen-
sionality as early as the 1930’s, the book also made available to an American audience for 
the first time many of the arguments of his erstwhile colleagues at the Institute of Social Re-
search, in particular Max Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno’s Dialectic of Enlightenment, a 
work not yet translated, indeed no longer even in print in German, and thus virtually un-
known in the English-speaking world.1 It also tacitly drew on the contention of Friedrich 
Pollock that “state capitalism” –or what was sometimes called “organized capitalism”– had 
somehow contrived to suspend the contradictions that Marx had insisted would create a 
terminal crisis that would culminate, as Luxemburg famously put it, either in “socialism 
or barbarism”. 
But whereas the analyses of Horkheimer, Adorno and Pollock had been conceived in 
the desperate years of the Second World War, at what arguably was the nadir of modern 
Western civilization, One-dimensional Man appeared at a very different historical juncture, 
a time when desperation had given way to a certain complacency about the superiority of 
“the American way of life” to totalitarianisms of the right and left. A great deal of its power 
was derived from the relentless and unqualified way Marcuse debunked that assumption, 
daring to question the value of the welfare state, denouncing the “end of ideology” thesis as 
itself ideological, and linking trends in academic philosophy with those in society as a whole. 
If as Adorno famously said in Minima Moralia, “in psychoanalysis nothing is true except 
the exaggerations” (Adorno, 1978: 49), One-dimensional Man also seemed to get to truths 
that were hitherto occluded because its author was willing without apology to push his ar-
guments to hyperbolic extremes. His was certainly not the vision of America that most of 
1 The earlier discussions are noted in Shapiro (1970: 184). He challenges the idea that somehow “two-dimensionality” 
is normal and “one-dimensionality” an aberration caused by technological domination.
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our citizens shared in 1964; indeed, the point of the book was precisely that they had been 
prevented from seeing through it by the mystifying ruses of our culture. But, in its very in-
transigent excessiveness, it hoped to open a tear in the fabric of the bland consensus that 
still prevailed. This expression of hope, to be sure, was still more of a “message in a bottle” 
(Flaschenpost) for an uncertain posterity than a clarion call to immediate action, but it was 
still meant as an act of defiance against impotent resignation.2
The joke history had in store for Marcuse was, of course, that almost immediately af-
ter he had declared critique exhausted and practical intervention in the world fruitless, the 
upheaval of the l960’s proved him, at least to many observers, woefully wrong. It became 
possible for some to say, as Douglas Kellner was still able to do as late as l988, that:
Marcuse exaggerated the stability of capitalism and failed to analyze adequately its crisis-tenden-
cies and contradictions. Consequently, his theory of “one-dimensional” society cannot account 
either for the eruption of social revolt on a global sale in the 1960’s, or for the global crisis of ca-
pitalism in the 1970’s and 1980’s (Kellner, 1988: 180).
In the works that followed One-dimensional Man, especially the 1969 Essay on Liberation, 
Marcuse himself cautiously acknowledged he had been deaf to the rumblings beneath his feet. 
But if perhaps less than precise in the short run, it is not so clear that One-dimensional 
Man was mistaken in its general observations about the ways in which capitalism had suc-
ceeded in blunting or containing forces that purported to subvert it. It is hard to not wonder 
who has been proven the better prophet, when Kellner goes on to say that: 
[Marcuse] failed to perceive the extent to which his theory articulated a stage of historical deve-
lopment that was soon coming to a close and that would give way to a new era marked by a world 
crisis of capitalism and by social revolt and revolutionary struggles both within and without ad-
vanced capitalist societies (Kellner, 1988: 180).
It is not, however, my intention here to assign marks for prescience or to play the tired game 
of making solemn pronouncements about where we are in the never-ending story of the 
terminal crisis of capitalism, pronouncing the glass half-empty or proclaiming it instead as 
2 The later dispute between Marcuse and his erstwhile Institut colleagues over when the bottle was to be uncorked 
is treated in Voigts (2010). He notes that the metaphor was first used by Horkheimer in a letter written to Adorno in 
1940 (Voigts, 2010: 21). It reappeared in a number of places, none perhaps as well-known as in Minima Moralia, where 
Adorno wrote “Even at the time the hope of leaving behind messages in bottles on the flood of barbarism bursting on 
Europe was an amiable illusion: the desperate letters stuck in the mud of the spring of rejuvenescence and were worked 
up by a band of Noble Human-Beings and other riff-raff into highly artistic but inexpensive wall ornaments” (Adorno, 
1978: 209). Interestingly, the “even then” refers to the early 20th century reception of Nietzsche, not his own era, but the 
phrase seemed even more apt for his own predicament as an exile in America.
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half full. It is perhaps better to rehearse the now familiar lament –was it first voiced by Rus-
sell Jacoby?– that the problem with late capitalism is that it is never late enough, and then 
move on to other questions. The one in particular I want to address is not how we can ex-
plain the ironic reversal of One-dimensional Man’s analysis, or to ponder why the reversal 
itself was not to last,  but rather the role of irony itself in One-dimensional Man. What, I 
want to ask, is its relationship to the concept of two-dimensionality, which Marcuse inhe-
rited from Hegel? Is there a difference between an ironic distinction between surface and 
depth and the dialectical one posited by Marcuse and other Hegelian Marxists? Must we 
furthermore differentiate among varieties of irony to do justice to its dialectical potential? 
But before we address these questions, we have to pause to consider a troubling possibil-
ity: that irony in any and all of its forms may have become impotent in the modern world, 
losing whatever subversive potential it may once have had. It was precisely this threat that 
Adorno had considered in an aphorism in Minima Moralia titled “Juvenal’s error,” composed 
in 1947 (Adorno, 1974: 209). The title refers to the Roman poet’s claim that it was “difficult 
not to write satire,” which Adorno claims is no longer the case in the modern world, a de-
nial he extends to irony as well. Irony, Adorno argues, 
[…] convicts its object by presenting it as what it purports to be; and without passing judgment, 
as if leaving a blank for the observing subject, measures it against its being-in-itself. It shows up 
the negative by confronting the positive with its own claim to positivity.” (Adorno, 1974: 210).3 
It thus needs no conceptual mediation or even interpretation, but rather relies on an inter-
subjective consensus about values, which it can then tacitly employ as a standard by which 
to measure and find wanting the status quo. It is thus comparable to what the Frankfurt 
School liked to call “immanent critique,” which drew its critical edge from invoking a so-
ciety’s noble ideals against the bleak reality that dubiously claimed to embody them. The 
critical ground of irony and immanent critique alike is thus outrage at the actual betrayal 
of laudable ideals, ideals shared by all in a society, that are woefully unrealized. For irony, 
like immanent critique, must take seriously the ideologies that are falsely claimed to des-
cribe a reality that fails to live up to them, ideologies which nonetheless contain values and 
goals worth striving to realize.
But writing in the shadow of the Second World War, Adorno sourly concluded that both 
satire and irony are no longer possible:
3 Whether Adorno himself honored this prohibition on irony is questionable. In Minima Moralia, after all, he 
employed a number of ironic inversions –e.g., “melancholy science” for Nietzsche’s “gay science,” “the whole is the 
untrue” for Hegel’s “the whole is the true”– which suggested he expected his readers to be able to read ironically. For 
a discussion, see Rose (1978: 16).
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Irony’s medium, the difference between ideology and reality, has disappeared. The former resigns 
itself to confirmation of reality by its mere duplication. Irony used to say: such it claims to be, but 
such it is; today, however, the world, even in its most radical lie, falls back on the argument that 
things are like this, a simple finding which coincides, for it, with the good. There is not a crevice in 
the cliff of the established order in which the ironist might hook a fingernail (Adorno, 1974: 211).
Here we get an anticipation of Marcuse’s claim that flat one-dimensionality is now the order 
of the day. Neither irony nor immanent critique is possible when no yawning gap between 
ideology and reality exists to produce the necessary outrage to motivate them. Instead, all 
that is left is a dull affirmation of a status quo by disillusioned and passive observers who 
have utterly lost whatever hope they might once have harbored that there is any meaning-
ful alternative. The indignation that fueled satire and irony from Juvenal to modern times 
is now a fading memory; we have learned, Adorno seems to be saying, to love the culture 
industry in the same way the citizens of Orwell’s Oceana loved Big Brother –is it a coinci-
dence that the aphorism “Juvenal’s error” was composed the same year as 1984?– and can 
no longer rely on a tacit consensus that something better is both desirable and possible.
Was irony still operative in One-dimensional Man? Is it something Marcuse validated in 
itself or merely used as a tool in the service of a post-ironic alternative? Does he, in fact, have 
a consistent attitude towards its function in the world whose bleak prospects he laments in 
his book? The first thing that must be acknowledged is that Marcuse’s rhetoric often derives 
its power from his indignant insistence that what claims to be the case is in fact reversed by 
reality. In the very first paragraphs of the book’s preface, we are told, inter alia, that:
[…] we submit to the peaceful production of the means of destruction, to the perfection of waste, 
to being educated for a defense which deforms the defenders and that which they defend [and] 
the political needs of society become individual needs and aspirations, their satisfaction promo-
tes business and the commonweal, and the whole appears to be the very embodiment of Reason. 
And yet this society is irrational as a whole (Marcuse, 1991: xli). 
Reading passages like this in 1971, Ronald Aronson, one of Marcuse’s most devoted stu-
dents, could claim that they are “rich with irony, joining terms and concepts kept apart by 
the mass media: perfection and waste; productivity and destruction, growth and repres-
sion, peace and war, capabilities and domination.” (Aronson, 1971: 261). Irony in this sense 
indeed remains a central tool of Marcuse’s analysis as the book develops, one celebrated 
example being his critique of repressive or controlled desublimation, in which unconstra-
ined libidinal energy serves the smoother functioning of a still unfree social and cultural 
order, rather than the liberation it promises (an argument that appears in another form 
around the same time in his critique of repressive tolerance).
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Marcuse’s reliance on irony indeed went the surface rhetoric of his argument. In fact, 
in 1970, an orthodox Marxist critic, the philosopher of law Mitchell Franklin, could con-
tribute an essay to Telos titled “The irony of the beautiful soul in Marcuse,” lamenting the 
ways in which Romantic notions of subjective irony had allegedly infected Marcuse’s entire 
philosophy with an impotent Idealism that was the opposite of a robust dialectical materi-
alism (Franklin, 1970).4 The term “beautiful soul” was, of course, taken from Hegel, whose 
critique of Romantic irony as “infinite absolute negativity” (Hegel, 1920: 93-94) informed 
Franklin’s claim that Marcuse had fallen prey to an existentialist fetish of ambiguity, nihi-
lation and endless displacement, which failed to acknowledge the still vibrant role of the 
working class as the revolutionary subject of history. Franklin’s confidence that orthodox 
dialectical materialism could still serve as an antidote to the disengaged “beautiful souls” 
of Romantic ironists unable to throw their lot in with the progressive forces of history was 
misplaced in 1970 –as even the editors of Telos themselves acknowledged (Delfini and Pic-
cone, 1986: 54) – and seems even more so today. But his sensitivity to the central role of 
irony in Marcuse’s oeuvre is worth noting.
The question, of course, is what kind of irony was it and did it have the nefarious impli-
cations that orthodox dialecticians like Franklin claimed it did? To answer this question, let 
me distinguish among three kinds of irony which I will call: 1) cynical, 2) paradoxical or un-
stable, and 3) dramatic or world historical, and then offer some thoughts on what might be 
seen as a fourth alternative. Cynical irony, expressing a loss of confidence in a meaningful 
gap between ideal and reality, was already accelerating in the interwar era, especially during 
the heyday of the “new objectivity” in the Germany out of which the Frankfurt School had 
emerged. It shows itself in the “cool conduct,” to borrow Helmut Lethen’s phrase, that col-
lapsed the distinction between interiority and exteriority, producing a self that is an armored 
shell with no soft core of authenticity beneath (Lethen, 2002). It has even been discerned 
in the plays and poetry of Bertolt Brecht, by for example Peter Sloterdijk in his Critique of 
Cynical Reason. Noting that Brecht urged his public not to live off the “good old values,” but 
to start with the “bad new reality,” he writes,
Obviously, a new quality of irony and a non-affirmative form of affirmation makes itself felt here. 
In this irony, it is not a subject that has ‘stayed clean’ that reveals itself, who, distanced, above 
the fronts, the melee, and the tumult, tries to save its integrity. It is rather the irony of a bashed 
ego who has got caught up in the clockwork (rather like Charlie Chaplin in Modern Times) who 
4 Franklin taught at the University of New York, Buffalo, where he was a mentor of many of Telos’s founding figures 
during their graduate school days. When he died in 1986, the journal had a special section of essays in his honor 
(Delfini and Piccone, 1986).
73Irony and dIalectIcs: One-DimensiOnal man and 1968 ⎥
Revista Mexicana de Ciencias Políticas y Sociales⎥ Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México
Nueva Época, Año lxiii, núm. 234 ⎥ septiembre-diciembre de 2018 ⎥ pp. 67-84⎥ ISSN-2448-492X
doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.22201/fcpys.2448492xe.2018.234.65810
makes its hands as dirty as the circumstances are and who, in the midst of the goings-on, only 
takes care to observe alertly what it encounters (Sloterdijk, 1988: 441).
With Brecht, Sloterdijk contends, “the pugnacious irony appropriate to modernity makes 
itself felt: cynical irony. It does not resist reality with ‘imagined fantasies’ but exercises re-
sistance in the form of unresisting accommodation” (Sloterdijk, 1988: 441).  
Such cynical irony might still be at home in the world described by Adorno in Minima 
Moralia in which there is no crevice in the cliff of the established order to allow ironic dis-
tance to gain a critical foothold. It also reappeared in the heyday of postmodernism in the 
l990’s (Bewes, 1997: 37-41), when imbued with melancholic affect, it could imply impotent 
surrender to the incoherence of a world that defied both understanding and transforma-
tion. But it is certainly hard to reconcile with the frankly utopian impulse –whether or not 
fleshed out by “imagined fantasies”– that could still motivate Marcuse to write One-dimen-
sional Man. For all his respect for Brecht, whose “estrangement effect” he praises in that 
book and elsewhere, Marcuse did not embrace this kind of tactic, which risked the loss of 
any critical distance from that entangling clockwork in which it is enmeshed. 
Another alternative, which we might call “paradoxical” or “unstable,” is more closely allied 
with the “beautiful soul” often identified with the German Romantics, in particular Fried-
rich Schlegel, who developed it in the 1790’s in his Kritische and Athenäums Fragmente. It 
operates on an essentially philosophical level. From its perspective, there are two stubbornly 
constant obstacles to attaining the full truth. The first arises from the inadequacy of lan-
guage to communicate the content of thought or the intention of the speaker, what in a later 
vocabulary would be the gap in every sign between signifier and signified. All language is a 
thus only a fragment of or a limited perspective on a perpetually inaccessible totality. Irony 
expresses this transcendental condition of language, in which subjects are always fractured, 
at once empirical and ideal, never at one with their authentic selves. As Schlegel famously 
put it, “irony is a permanent parabasis,” referring to the trope in Greek tragedy in which the 
dramatic action is interrupted by the chorus stepping to the front of the stage and directly 
addressing the audience. What parabasis implies, in other words, is the denial of seamless 
narrative, non-reflective immediacy, and unity of action without something happening to 
undermine it. Parabasis is permanent because the apparent immediacy of the chorus’s ad-
dress is itself open to reflective interruption, and so on down. Every intended meaning is 
thwarted, or at least distorted, by the imperfect medium of its expression, which is in ex-
cess of what is deliberately meant. In addition to parabasis, the favored trope of unstable 
irony is catachresis, in which, among other things, words fail to mean or refer unambigu-
ously to one thing in particular.
In addition to the ironic implications of language’s unsublatable self-contestation, un-
stable irony drew on another, more metaphysical assumption: the paradoxical impossibility 
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and yet necessity of questing after the Absolute. Any attempt to know the Absolute, to reach 
the unconditioned foundation of meaning and express it adequately, is bound to fail because 
such knowledge would necessarily falsify it in the very act of conditioning it –as shown in 
vain attempts to define God’s characteristics in a positive way– but we cannot refrain from 
searching for it. Thus, Socratic questioning is the model of infinite striving for a knowledge 
that is always just out of the reach of the questioner. Both poetry and philosophy for the 
Romantic believer in paradoxical irony are forever becoming and never finished, always 
striving and never reaching a state of satiation.
It was, of course, this version of radical, destabilizing irony that attracted the critical at-
tention of later commentators like Kierkegaard in the 19th century and the admiration of 
post-structuralists in the 20th. To cite a typical formulation from Kevin Newmark’s recent 
Irony on Occasion, written in the tradition of Derrida and de Man, irony is “this self-resist-
ing –that is, infinitely, although non-reflexively repetitive– truth about the literary structure 
of all possible philosophical meaning.” (Newmark, 2012: 38). Here we have an essentially 
transcendental argument about the human condition, the inevitably rhetorical cum liter-
ary refraction of even the most stringently philosophical reasoning, and the impossibility 
of ever escaping from the ambiguities that ensue. Shorn of the anxiety that infused the Ro-
mantic worldview, it could evolve into a staple of popular culture. As one student of “the 
ironic” in more recent history has noted, whereas the Romantics were still in search of au-
thenticity in one form or another, it has become “comfortable with the artifices of mass 
culture, and the phantasmagoria of symbols and representations that accompany a capital-
ist economic order” (Saler, 2004: 140). Not much of this version of irony can obviously be 
found in Marcuse’s worldview.
How congenial was it instead to a third variant, which can be called dramatic or world-his-
torical irony? In dramatic irony, the audience is given access to a knowledge of foretold 
outcomes or at least hidden meanings that are denied the characters in the play, allowing 
its members a critical distance from the action as it unfolds. We have early knowledge that 
is denied, say, to Oedipus and Othello, until the end of the play. Likewise, in what might be 
called “world-historical irony,” we benefit from a kind of proleptic hindsight, which grants 
us a superior, more total knowledge in comparison with that of the characters in a drama 
whose outcome they cannot foretell. Their intentions, we can appreciate as they cannot, have 
unintended consequences. That is, we adopt in advance the position of the last historian, an 
omniscient narrator who can see the shape of the meta-narrative after it has fully unfolded. 
Hegel’s critique of the Romantics, which we’ve noted was invoked by orthodox dialecti-
cal materialists like Mitchell Franklin against Marcuse, sought to historicize what had been 
transcendentalized by Schlegel in precisely this way. As in the case of the melancholic “un-
happiness consciousness” itself, Hegel saw paradoxical irony as a necessary, but ultimately 
surpassable moment in a dialectical process that he believed would have a comic rather than 
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ironic outcome, revealing itself as more of a good totality than a bad infinity. The plural-
ism of partial viewpoints, expressing irreconcilable subjective perspectivalism, that fueled 
the Romantic distrust of the Absolute were all folded into one meta-subjective standpoint, 
which sublated rather than abolished them. The Romantics’ ironic detachment, ultimately 
frivolous for Hegel because of its escape from the serious business of living a meaningful 
life, was overcome in a synthesis of subject and object, in which engagement rather than 
distance defined the human investment in the world in which we were thrown. For Hegel, 
in short, individual moments in the dialectical process, however negative, contradictory or 
partial, should be understood as a necessary stage in an historical theodicy. 
Kierkegaard shared Hegel’s insistence that aesthetic detachment—hovering above the 
world as in the case of Romantic beautiful souls who refused to get their hands dirty--was 
an inadequate response to the challenges of our existence, ultimately lacking in the seri-
ousness that true commitment entailed. Where, however, he differed was in his refusal to 
embrace the positive sublation of the ironic standpoint, the submersion, we might say, of 
the figure of Socrates, the critical questioner, in the speculative truth of Platonic Reason.5 
As one commentator has put it, Kierkegaard honored “the uniquely personal contribution 
of Socrates to the foundations of the dialectical imagination” (Ferguson, 1995: 42). But it 
was more of a negative than positive version of the dialectic. Despite the unintended conse-
quences of subjective actions, the self for Kierkegaard is not to be dissolved into an objective 
process ruled by the “cunning of Reason.” For Kierkegaard, the arrow of irony is reversed. 
All moments of apparent positivity should be understood ironically as illusory consola-
tions for the inherently unsublatable distance between subject and object, individual and 
collectivity, human and divine. For Hegel, in contrast, individual moments in the dialecti-
cal process, however negative, contradictory or partial, should be understood ironically as 
a necessary stage in an historical theodicy. 
Where, to return to our main question, does Marcuse stand in this shifting terrain of 
attitudes towards irony? At his bleakest, he echoes the bitter complaint of Adorno in Min-
ima Moralia that there is no space for ironic distance in the present one-dimensional world. 
It is, he tells us, a world “in which ideas, aspirations, and objectives that, by their content, 
transcend the established universe of discourse and action are either repelled or reduced 
to terms of this universe” (Marcuse, 1991: 12). The “total mobilization” of all media to de-
fend the status quo has made communication of “transcending contents […] technically 
impossible […] the impossibility of speaking a non-reified language, of communicating the 
negative…has materialized” (Marcuse, 1991: 68). Even the potentially productive discontent 
of the “unhappiness consciousness” has been blunted by the rise of the pseudo-happiness 
produced by “repressive desublimation.” Indeed, the very concept of Reason, which remained 
5 For a useful discussion of their differing attitudes towards irony, see Taylor (1980: 94-95).
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for Marcuse a standard by which social injustice and oppression could be measured, was in 
danger of losing its critical edge: “in this society, the rational rather than the irrational be-
comes the most effective vehicle of mystification” (Marcuse, 1991: 189).
With pronouncements like these, Marcuse demonstrated how much in the early 1960’s 
he still shared with the Horkheimer and Adorno of the late 1940’s. It may thus seem, as crit-
ics like Franklin argued, that this attitude brought him close to the unengaged “beautiful 
soul” decried by Hegel, but it is not because he, or they, saw the world through the subjective 
irony of Romantic infinite unsublatable reflexivity. Nor, as we have already argued, did he 
adopt the Brechtian ironic cynicism that dove into the “bad new reality” and never found a 
way to come up for air. Instead, Marcuse’ mobilization of both the rhetoric of irony and the 
contention that it was evident in the objective workings of the world in which he lived was 
based on a Hegelian belief –now more desperate hope than self-confident certainty– that 
despite everything, a second dimension was still at least a potentiality in a one-dimensional 
world. Pace Franklin, he too anchored his own position in a redemptive meta-narrative in 
which the negativity of the Great Refusal would somehow, some day be turned into the uto-
pian positivity of a world in which art and technology, Reason and the libido, freedom and 
democracy were reconciled without contradiction. 
If therefore we have to identify the type of irony present in One-dimensional Man, it is 
neither that of the beautiful soul hovering above the world in order to keep his hands clean 
nor the cynical realist fully immersed in it, but that of the chastened, but still hopeful his-
torical materialist who believes the future can still redeem the promises of the past, however 
much they are now thwarted. It is the irony of a narrator of an unfolding story that, against 
all odds, he thinks still has a chance of ending happily. But because he has no faith in any 
immanent force or movement or agency who can serve as the heroic protagonist of the 
story, it is also the irony of an impatient spectator who has the honesty not to identify him-
self with a Promethean pseudo-agent able to make rather than suffer his fate. 
At the end of the book, Marcuse locates the feeble repository of whatever promise of 
a future alternative there might be in the realm of art, which he claims is the enclave of a 
genuinely emancipatory rationality that defies the irrationality of instrumental reason. He 
already calls on what in his last work he would identify as the “aesthetic dimension” (Mar-
cuse, 1978) as the only plausible answer, at least for now, to one-dimensional society, even 
going so far as to assert that “the more blatantly irrational the society becomes, the greater 
the rationality of the artistic universe” (Marcuse, 1978: 239). In what is a final ironic gesture, 
he concludes that “the advancing one-dimensional society alters the relationship between 
the rational and irrational. Contrasted with the fantastic and insane aspects of its rational-
ity, the realm of the irrational becomes the home of the really rational –of the ideas which 
may ‘promote the art of life’” (Marcuse, 1978: 247). But because it is ultimately life that must 
be changed, rather than art serving as a permanent refuge from it, Marcuse refused the aes-
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thetic escape from engaged commitment to transforming life that Kierkegaard and Hegel 
alike had condemned in Romanticism.
Marcuse, in short, maintained a position that cannot be identified with the elevated irony 
of the beautiful soul perpetually hovering above the world or with the cynical irony of the 
armored subject striving to survive amidst its ruins, let alone with the radical irony of the 
post-modernist skeptic who places us eternally in the prison-house or reflecting hall of mir-
rors of language. It is rather the irony of a latter-day Hegelian, stubbornly holding on to a 
world-historical perspective, who believes we can ultimately move beyond the stage of “in-
finite absolute negativity” into a more positive “comic” reconciliation beyond irony of any 
kind. His pessimism about doing so in the immediate future thus never descended into the 
interminably melancholic lassitude that Kierkegaard for one identified with the ironic atti-
tude at its most self-abnegating. 
Another way to characterize the ironic moment in One-dimensional Man is to identify 
it with what is sometimes called “stable irony,” which J.M. Bernstein describes in The Phi-
losophy of the Novel as dividing:
[The] readership into “us” and “them,” aligning the knowing reader with the author in a space of 
truth, a space free from vanity and self-deception […] the epistemic effect of a stable irony is to 
establish a community between author and reader, a community of the undeceived, a commu-
nity of truth whose authority is the authorial separation of appearance and reality which only the 
knowing can recognize (Bernstein, 1984: 161).
As in the case of Socratic irony, it can employ temporary dissimulation in the service of ul-
timately moving us towards virtue. For all its apparent despair, One-dimensional Man was 
in fact written with the faith that such a community, however small, could exist and grow. 
And as the success of the book in stimulating its expansion shows, it was for a while at least 
a viable assumption. In fact, that we are still reading it today, fifty years later, suggests that 
such a community of readers who find themselves largely in agreement with its arguments 
has not entirely vanished. 
But I also think we would be fooling ourselves if we didn’t take seriously the intervening 
changes, what at the beginning of this paper I described as the ironic jokes played by history 
on many of those arguments. As a result, it is increasingly difficult to mobilize the confidence 
that we are part of a meaningful “community of the undeceived” who really know which 
way history is going or even should be going and can make sense of the forces or agencies 
that will help us move in the right direction. For we may well be closer to a situation al-
ready characterized by Jürgen Habermas back in 1985 as “die neue Unübersichtlichkeit,” the 
“new unsurveyability” (Habermas, 1985) in which we cannot plausibly adopt the position 
of a world-historical narrator capable of sustaining the stable irony based on an imagined 
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community of the enlightened adopted by Marcuse in One-dimensional Man. It was per-
haps Richard Rorty who most cogently expressed the sobering implications of this loss in 
his defense of liberal “ironists” in his 1989 collection Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity. Ac-
cording to Rorty, they realized “that anything can be made to look good or bad by being 
redescribed,” and thus lacked any faith in their ability to choose final vocabularies and make 
serious commitments in a world of contingency and uncertainty (Rorty, 1989: 73). Not only 
did they acknowledge the impossibility of firm and unimpeachable value commitments, 
but also admitted the tentative and revisable quality of all attempts to write definitive nar-
ratives by which we might orient ourselves in a world of rapid change.
The question that I want to address as conclusion is thus the following: is there, in fact, a 
more promising notion of irony, latent in One-dimensional Man, that avoids the limitations 
of disinterested distance, cynical compromise, and the dizzying mise en abyme of post-mod-
ern or the anything goes relativism of liberal irony, and yet does not rely on the dubious 
security of a discredited world-historical narrative that is harder and harder to endorse? Per-
haps the answer lies in that aesthetic dimension in which Marcuse poured so many of his 
utopian aspirations. One place to begin is the suggestive discussion of irony in theater from 
Sophocles to Beckett by a third-generation Frankfurt School theorist, Christoph Menke, 
in his Tragic Play, first published in 2005 and translated four years later (Menke, 2009: 50).
In discussing Oedipus Rex, Menke borrows Connop Thirwall’s distinction between the 
“irony of the action” and the “the poet’s irony.” The former means that the tragic hero is not 
merely the passive victim of an externally mandated fate, but rather unintentionally brings 
it about himself. In the case of Oedipus, his fate is unwittingly brought about through the 
curse he hurls on the unknown murderer of his wife’s late husband, a curse he hopes will 
lift the plague of infertility that has struck the city of Thebes. As a result, his own miserable 
destiny is self-inflicted, for he inadvertently had cursed himself, not knowing that he had 
been that very murderer. The “poet’s irony,” which is another way to say what we have called 
“dramatic irony,” is that of the playwright, expressed by the chorus, and grasped by the au-
dience, which knows from the outside what is unfolding before its eyes. It is the irony of 
the distant spectator, not the protagonist in the drama, a bit like the world-historical ironist 
who can anticipate the outcome of the story and knows the narrative as a whole, a knowl-
edge not yet available to the characters in the action. 
Now, what makes this suggestive for our purposes is Menke’s argument that the two 
ironic positions are in fact integrated in the case of Oedipus, whose curse unintentionally 
brings about his downfall. 
In his ironic-equivocal speech [his curse] Oedipus knows of the tragic-ironic reversal of his pros-
perity into adversity because he stands in relation to himself at the ironic distance of the spectator. 
And by means of this ironic-equivocal speech Oedipus brings about the tragic-ironic reversal of 
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his prosperity into adversity because he stands in relation to himself at the ironic distance of the 
author [in the sense of unwittingly authoring his own fate] (Menke, 2009: 50). 
In other words, the subject-positions of the unwitting author of an ironic reversal, who 
is responsible for doing the deed, and that of the knowing spectator who understands its 
meaning from afar merge in the end. Much can be said about this merger, but what is im-
portant for our purposes is that it precludes the “cool conduct” of both the cynical ironist 
and the beautiful, but detached soul hovering above the world. Instead, it embodies at least 
in part that engagement in existence that both Kierkegaard and Hegel defended, each in 
his own way, an engagement that implies that irony need not be without practical impli-
cations in the way we confront the challenges of life, even if we cannot always bring about 
exactly what we intend.
The implication of all this will, I hope, become clearer if we turn in conclusion to yet an-
other commentator on the meaning of irony, the philosopher and psychoanalyst Jonathan 
Lear, who titled the Tanner Lectures on Human Values he gave at Harvard in 2008 A Case 
for Irony (Lear, 2011). Drawing on Kierkegaard’s analysis of Socratic irony, but distancing 
himself from the Dane’s negative interpretation, at least in his early writings, of its dangers, 
Lear argues that an ironic existence can be a productive path towards what he calls the pur-
suit of human excellence. To the extent that it is a form of detachment, it is detachment from 
social pretense, alienation from given social roles, but is also one accompanied by a kind of 
uncanny longing for what is lost. Thus, “developing a capacity for ironic disruption may be 
a manifestation of seriousness about one’s practical identity. It is not merely a disruption of 
one’s practical identity; it is a form of loyalty to it” (Lear, 2011: 22). That is, it involves a rec-
ognition that although the pretense of already living up to ideals needs to be shattered, the 
ideals themselves can still function to impel us forward. Is there a way in which this personal 
quest has an implication beyond the self, an implication that might even be understood as 
political? Lear contends that the point of irony correctly understood is
[…] not simply to destroy pretenses, but to inject a certain form of not-knowing into polis life….
it shows the difficulty of becoming human: not just the arduousness of maintaining a practical 
identity in the face of temptation, but the difficulty of getting the hang of a certain kind of playful, 
disrupting existence to understand –that is, to grasp practically– the limits of human understan-
ding of such excellence (Lear, 2011: 36).
Rather than leading to the superficial relativism of Rorty’s liberal ironist who distrusts all 
final vocabularies and refuses to see any narrative as definitive, Lear claims that this kind 
of irony can lead to a more serious and intense engagement with what turns out to be one’s 
own final vocabulary.
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Taking off his philosopher’s hat and putting on his psychoanalyst’s, Lear then argues that 
unconscious psychic fantasies are a source of the ideal that we still yearn for when we real-
ize the inadequacy of social pretense and allow an uncanny return of what is repressed, an 
unheimlich refusal to be “at home” in the present world and in our present identities. Rather 
than understanding psychic unity on the basis of ego strength to be the ultimate goal of our 
lives, he argues that experiencing the ironic disruption produced by this return is a much 
clearer sign of a life well lived. Instead of seeking to tame our desires and relinquish our 
fantasies in the name of ego-strength or rational mastery, 
[…] it would seem to be rational to call into question the ultimate rationality of the picture of ra-
tionality as simply consisting in my ability to step back and reflect on how well or badly items of 
consciousness conform to my conscious practical identity (Lear, 2011: 67). 
Irony therefore allows us to remain within the unresolved tension between what in the 
terms Christoph Menke introduces in his discussion of tragedy are the “irony of agency” 
and “the poet’s irony” in the sense that it involves a certain responsibility for our destinies 
with an awareness that there are times when we have to surrender to forces or desires that 
are outside of that control. But unlike the tragic outcome of an Oedipus Rex, in which both 
ironic reversals conspire to turn our prosperity into adversity, it has the opposite potential: 
to move us towards more meaningful lives well spent in the pursuit of ideals worth pursuing. 
In short, we know we are not fully in control, but we don’t relinquish the responsibility of 
acting as if our actions are meaningful in determining outcomes. 
And so, we arrive in conclusion back at One-dimensional Man with an enriched under-
standing of the role of irony in its underlying make-up. For if we concede the untenability 
of the larger world-historical narrative that Marcuse himself could not entirely abandon, 
we can still find in his insistence on the superiority of a two-dimensional understanding 
of the human condition over its one-dimensional alternative something akin to what Jon-
athan Lear calls the committed pursuit of personal excellence, albeit with the potential to 
transcend the purely personal. It as an ironic attitude that is neither cynical nor disengaged, 
but instead resists accommodation to social pretense and draws on the unfulfilled fantasies 
of our unconscious to fuel our striving beyond the status quo. Like the irony Menke dis-
cerns in Greek tragedy, it both acknowledges the force of external circumstances and the 
vagaries of fortune, but also helps us to see that we are responsible at least in part for our 
fate. It may not provide the reassurance of Socratic or dramatic irony at its most knowing, 
but in a world that will not grant us such knowledge, it keeps alive the negative power of 
two-dimensionality that Marcuse so eloquently defended. It may not lead to a melodramatic 
Great Refusal intransigently rejecting the totality of oppressive circumstances in our lives, 
but it may give us the resilience to keep marshalling all the little refusals that can make even 
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damaged lives worth living. And in so doing, it may also inspire a meaningful political en-
gagement, one that moves beyond the pursuit of personal excellence to something larger. In 
that pursuit, there may well be a positive role for irony with all of its inherent two-dimen-
sionality and resistance to settled meanings, rather than rejecting it as merely a marker of 
impotent cynicism, aesthetic escapism or the reveries of a beautiful soul hovering above a 
fallen world it cannot hope to change.
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